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ABSTRACT: The paper bridges between a science-based metamathematical model of emerging truth and 
truth emerging from inquiry within ordinary contexts of argumentation. This requires that the underlying 
intuitions driving the notion of truth in the scientific image be made clear and analogues identified in a 
manner that permits their application within the ordinary contexts found in the manifest image.  
 
KEY WORDS: ethical argument, inquiry, legal argument, logic, metamathematics, scientific argument, 
truth 
 
 
Wilfred Sellars gave us a powerful insight into human understanding when he 
distinguished the scientific from the manifest image in Science, Perception and Reality. 
The distinction is roughly between the world as investigated and understood through the 
constructed concepts and special tools of science and the world as understand by 
naturally evolving concepts and ordinary sense perception. Both of these perspectives 
have afforded considerable success in producing useful and presumably true knowledge. 
And both have been the concern of philosophers since the inception of philosophical 
thought. 
Philosophy has vacillated between the two images with great names connected 
with either and sometimes both. Plato’s views can fruitfully be seen as extrapolated from 
the best science of his day, geometry, and Aristotle’s from biology, The relation of Kant 
to Newtonian physics is well know and the emphasis on philosophy of science in the 20th 
century testifies to the power of the scientific image. Yet the manifest image is 
philosophically compelling for it, after all, is the expression of the phenomenology of 
being and the basis for all practical success until the technological driven era that began 
fitfully in classical times, moved forward in the 19th century and then exploded in the 20th 
with undoubtedly the greatest increase in the quantity and quality of knowledge in the 
history of humankind. 
This distinction is analogous to a similar polarity within logic and especially in its 
application to argumentation. On the one hand logical concepts have been drawn from 
science, most particularly, but not exclusively, mathematics; on the other hand ordinary 
reasoning as captured by inquiry in the manifest image has always been a counterpoint to 
the formal or mathematical. This is especially true in the last 30 years with the advent of 
informal logical and argumentation theory, which moved from the abstract 
characterization of argument as formally construed to an obviously more adequate 
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conception of argument as dialogical. With very few exceptions informal logicians and 
argumentation theorist have eschewed formal models in favor of conceptual structures as 
ordinarily deployed. To offer a mathematical model at this time, particularly one drawn 
from the practice of the science seems regressive, especially since such a model harkens 
back to the era of logical empiricism, a point of view no longer popular even in the 
philosophy of science. To offer such a model to informal logicians as an account relevant 
to argumentation seems no less the perverse, but offer such a model I have. 
For the past several years and in a number of publications I have offered a 
metamathematical model of emerging truth (MET) and embedded it in a variety of 
contexts relevant to argumentation. MET moves away from the natural notion of truth as 
correspondence, common in philosophical thought from Aristotle to Tarski. 
Correspondence requires that object of claims be specified independent of the claims 
themselves. Emerging truth sees truth as a function of such claims and the inquiry in 
which they are housed. Correspondence is plausible if arithmetic is our paradigm for truth 
generating inquiry, since the truths of arithmetic are known independent of the logic that 
accounts for there status as true (in arithmetic, provable). It may also have some purchase 
when we are dealing with brute facts of common experience. But when we move into the 
vast areas for which inquiry is required, truth independent of inquiry is impossible to 
ascertain, since it is the purpose of the inquiry to come know the very truths in question. 
The mathematical model itself can be seen as an existence proof; by developing 
an actual mathematical model of a philosophical concept one may, show that whatever 
else its failings, the concept is not vacuous. Of course the existence of a mathematical 
model does not show relevance to any particular area of concern. This is a major lesson to 
be drawn from the failure of mathematical logic to capture much of what was to be seen 
essential in argumentation by both informal logicians and argumentation theorists. 
In what follows I briefly outline the context that supports the model and then 
describe the models salient features. Then I will briefly sketch two applications of the 
model. First to legal argument, which has some affinity with scientific argument in that it 
is codified and hierarchical, and then to a more distant context, that of ethical argument. 
In this way I hope to indicate the power of the approach. 
 
THE MOTIVATION FOR THE MET 
 
The original model was designed in response to the following conjecture: If you ask a 
sane relatively well-informed person what the universe is made of, the answer is most 
likely to be some hodgepodge of words about atoms, molecules and the like. That is to 
say, the working ontology of the modern world is the ontology of medium level physical 
chemistry. The question then was how is ontology internal to a point of view such as 
physical chemistry warranted (Weinstein, 2002). But ontology is traditionally linked to 
truth and so if one understood the basis for ontological commitment one might have a 
clue as to how the notion of truth might be thought about (Weinstein, 2007). This is clear 
both logically and historically. The ontology of natural kinds gave Aristotle his basic 
understanding of the categorical proposition and through the development of a logical 
structure could define a truth predicate in terms of something analogous to the modern 
notion of satisfaction. In Plato the ontology of forms and the requirement of necessity as 
a hallmark of philosophical truth moved Plato to the geometrization of ontology as in the 
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Timeaus, a powerful metaphor that influenced Renaissance science particularly in 
Copernicus and Galileo, and resonated with the subsequent philosophical and scientific 
thought in Leibniz and Newton. In the 20th the link was made the basis for modern logic 
and much of modern metaphysics through the work of the Wittgenstein in the Tractatus 
and Russell’s logical atomism. The culmination may been seen in the Quineian aphorism, 
to be is to be the value of a variable, that is, ontology is to be exhibited through the 
medium of a truth predicate in an adequate logical language. 
More pertinently for the context of the paper, the model addressed my intuition of 
the centrality of Toulmin’s model to an adequate theory of argument, especially the 
notion of warrant. In a recent paper (Weinstein, 2006) I addressed some of the 
contentious issues surrounding Stephen Toulmin's influential jurisprudential model. The 
model gives clear sense of the distinction between backing warrants and grounds and, 
more important, shows why warrants cannot be collapsed into logical implications. Most 
important, the model permits an intuitive analysis of warrant kinds, which are seen as 
forming a hierarchy of logical strength. This affords a graded analysis of argumentative 
support in terms of the strength of the warrants brought forward.. By having a flexible 
notion of warrant the weight of argumentative support moves beyond reliance upon the 
evidence to include the robustness of the principled generalizations through which 
evidence is seen as relevant to the claim. This is essential, for example, to account for the 
nuance of expert testimony and opens the door to a deeper appreciation of the epistemic 
power of various disciplinary frames. 
The model draws its epistemology from an overt Copernican turn. That is, rather 
than looking to purportedly a priori criteria as the source of normativity, I look to 
successful practice (Weinstein, 2006a). I choose, what seems to me, the most successful 
epistemological practice in the history of human inquiry: physical chemistry as initiated 
by the development of the periodic table and continuing with increasing practical and 
theoretical advance through the 20th century, resulting in the most amazing increase of 
knowledge at the highest level of reliability in human history. Physical chemistry with its 
supporting array in physics and in its application to material science, both organic and 
inorganic is, arguably, the foundation of our entire technological competence. 
 
A BRIEF INFORMAL SKETCH OF THE MET 
 
The model presupposes a number of things that are unusual in formal logic but quite 
natural in actual argumentation (Weinstein, 2007a). The first is a relevance filter. It is 
assumes that any manifestly irrelevant premises are discarded as their irrelevance is 
ascertained. The second, that a discourse frame set the standards of rigor in 
argumentation and that degrees of rigor appropriate to an argumentation context are 
determined as the argumentation proceeds. This would be part of what the Amsterdam 
theorists call the opening stage, or part of the backing in Toulmin’s sense. Third, it is 
non-monotonic, that is to say inference is reconsidered as new premises are made 
available. Finally, it is dynamic rather than static. An inference is evaluated within a 
network of associated inferences and the history of the network. This is a basis for a deep 
reconsideration of the nature of warrants. Warrants are of varying strength, basic 
distinctions can be made in dimensions of strength, strong warrants are housed within a 
body of generalizations (not necessarily universal), strong warrants connect such bodies 
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of generalization into progressive networks and super strong warrants are strong warrants 
of exceptional breadth and depth. Although such language is metaphoric, a precise 
mathematical characterization has been offered in the papers indicated above. For the 
purpose here the mathematics is necessary, for it shows that the concepts are not vacuous, 
but not sufficient. For until such a view is shown to be relevant to actual argumentation, 
rather than then merely satisfying the stylized image that metamathemics imposes on 
logical discussions, the view is of little interest to informal logicians and argument 
theorists. This requires that the intuition behind the mathematics be exposed and its 
relevance to actual argument be demonstrated. One caution, after all is said and done the 
mathematics, no matter how imposing, must reduce to a clear and noetically powerful 
philosophical intuition. One should not be surprised if such an intuition is transparent and 
obvious once noticed, for that is the power of deep logical advance.  
The mathematics proper is characterized by two essential logical concepts, that of 
modeling (various weak entailment relationship with classical implication as a limiting 
case) and a deeper sense of entailment that relies on the connection between discrete sets 
of principles and even vocabulary (what in the philosophy of science is called reduction). 
Reductions are not unlike the analytic entailments of logical empiricism; my first 
intuition was to equate such entailments with L-true in Beta in the sense of Carnap's 
classic discussion in the Meaning and Necessity. I now see this connection in terms of a 
hierarchy of warrant kinds, that may often appear to be ‘meaning postulates’ but although 
more rigid then weaker warrants, such warrants are resistant to change and form the 
foundation of inter-theoretic connection that fuel conceptual advance and deeper 
understanding.  
Although the second of the two functions has the most novelty the first one 
permits a radical shift in perspective to be clearly seen: that is it is the dynamics, not the 
statics of argument wherein the essential logical concepts lie. The function that maps a 
theory onto a body of evidence, the basic insight behind philosophical accounts of 
explanation since Aristotle and canonized by Hempel and his followers, is no more than 
that condition that the for a significant claim to be about the world there has to be a 
‘match up.’ Of course the devil is in the details, but the deep intuition that science is true 
just when what it describes is the case has been at the center of modern logic and 
rightfully so. 
The problem, of course, is what is to be the case. One source of our strongest 
intuitions is the clarity and naturalness with which our sense perceptions, memory etc. 
conform to the world. If there is any candidate for the best epistemological practice 
besides for physical chemistry, it has to be common sense perceptual based reasoning, 
which we employ everyday and for the most part do rather well as measured by success 
at both the species and individual levels. But of course we make grievous errors. It is the 
path to correct these errors that the model attempts to indicate. The intuition drawn from 
physical chemistry is clear, We expect our descriptions and measurements to increase in 
reliable detail and to afford predictive success at an increasingly nuanced level, that is to 
say, the models of our assertions must be increasingly adequate to the reality that they 
attempt to describe. It is the dynamics of this advance that moves truth from truth in a 
model to truth in a chain of models the members of which are increasing in adequacy to 
the phenomena as we test and probe in standard ways. Those standard ways are 
themselves difficult to ascertain, but determine them we do in practice in all of those 
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domains in which we are increasingly successful with our inquiries. The notion has been 
given precise mathematical characterization in the MET, what is relevant here is the 
intuition. We are rarely right or wrong simpliciter (at least not in areas that requires 
argument). Rather the picture emerges through argumentation and other methods of 
inquiry. 
Whatever the power of the intuition of correspondence between our models and 
reality, physical chemistry teaches us a deeper lesson. It is not only more adequate 
descriptions and predictions that we require. We require that they be robust, that is 
reliable. Such robustness appears to be based not on any one chain models (sequences of 
observations and explanations) but by the coordination of many such sequences (model 
chains) through an overarching theory, and ultimately the unification of such theories in 
grand overarching theories that reconceptualize the elements of descriptive models in 
theoretic terms of deep explanatory power and enormous connectivity. The unification of 
myriad chemical explanations in the Periodic Table was only the first in a century of 
advances, as hitherto unrelated area of physical sickness were seen to follow analogous 
principles that could then be reconceptualized in terms of a powerful micro-theory that 
resulted in many more empirical determinations and a general increase in the adequacy of 
the theory-driven models. Organic chemistry is one such grand unification, giving us a 
rich understanding of the very architecture of life in chemical terms. The richly connected 
theories and practices within physical chemistry is the basis for our understanding of 
pretty much everything else in the physical universe, from the makeup of stars to the 
making of microchips. Being right in our empirical models is neither necessary nor 
sufficient. Incorrect models are frequently useful in practice (Cartwright, 1983). Our 
models need to be progressive, and they need to be embedded in a hierarchy of 
connections that give logical force to explanations by their depth and breadth, and such a 
wealth of coordinated theories needs, itself, to be progressive. The mathematics shows 
that these desiderata are not mere words or amorphous metaphors. The model gives 
precise mathematical content to each of these, and permits a definition of truth as 
emerging from inquiry.  
 
TWO APPLICATIONS OF THE MET 
 
Legal reasoning exists in the stylized context of lawyers’ briefs and court decisions. Each 
of this restrict the argument in a variety of ways, but the most compelling restriction on 
legal reasoning is a principle of coherence, stare decisis, a conservative principle that 
valorizes precedent. Briefs are constructed based on the facts of the matter and the legal 
precedents. But neither the facts nor the precedents are absolute, rather through the course 
of trial procedures factual claims are brought into question and through judges’ decisions 
and the appellate process the relevance of precedence is also open to question. The 
appellate structure forms a clear hierarchy of logical power. As one moves up the 
hierarchy judgments and the principles that they instantiate form a logically asymmetric 
chain: lower court decisions may be overturned by higher course decisions and not vice 
versa. Higher court decisions do, however, take into account the facts as brought forward 
in trial as well as the interpretations of the lower court. And so even higher order 
principles are defeasible in light of information from below. This asymmetric back and 
forth down a chain, with higher order principles and decisions offering meaning down the 
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chain and lower order descriptions and decisions giving content up the chain is captured 
in the MET. That aside, the model tells us that the adequacy of such a structure is a 
function of increasing articulation, depth and breadth over time. These are readily 
interpretable in legal reasoning. 
Based on the criteria of increasing articulation we would conjecture that a legal 
argument is logically compelling when it enables more of the details to be seen. That is, 
the laws cited in a brief illuminate more of the salient facts of the matter and show their 
relevance. It is more than some amorphous appeal to total evidence, rather arguments are 
evaluated by showing that through dialogical advance, the arguments brought forward 
(the laws cited) offer a lens that permits more of the evidence to be admitted for 
consideration as relevant to the determination under existing laws. 
Depth is easily defined in terms of the hierarchy of court decision. A legal 
argument is logically compelling when it reaches up through appellate decisions and so 
withstands its overturn on appellate grounds. The appellate procedures redefines the 
meaning of lower court cases, by seeing them to be in reinterpretable as (or in violation 
of) a higher order principle. A legal argument is sound when it permits of interpretations 
that show coherence with higher court rulings. 
Breath is also an apparent property of legal reasoning. Although law is divided 
into a number of discrete legal realms, torts, criminal law, family law etc., laws apply 
through a range of cases within these large groupings. Logically powerful laws cover 
their terrain and are usefully expanded to newly relevant areas. A powerful legal 
argument, for example, that extended copyright protection to digital media, shows its 
power by extending the basic legal concept from its original domain (print) to a new and 
relevantly similar medium (the world wide web). But the most powerful principles, deep 
procedural principles such as habeas corpus, unify realms of law by showing them to be 
subject to profound intuitions about the rule of law and the search for justice. 
MET gives a mathematical image of such a structure. Whether it will prove useful 
in analyzing actual legal argumentation remains to be seen. But its precision should 
permit computer models of legal argument to be constructed and their power across the 
array of laws and precedents determined. Although this may appear fanciful, lawyers and 
judges make such determinations as part their expert competence. An expert model based 
on such reasoning should be no more difficult to construct than expert programs for 
medical reasoning. Magnani (2001) offers a schematic of such expert systems that might 
be usefully applied to legal reasoning. In his schematic he indicates movements from data 
to explanations and vice versa. MET offers a possible structure for adding details to such 
an abstract account. The construction of a computer model for legal (or medical) 
reasoning based on MET would be the strongest evidence for its usefulness. But even in 
the intuitive terms of the discussion so far, it seems clear that concern with increasing 
articulation, depth and breadth afford an image of legal reasoning that gives coherence to 
its complexity and moves us far from a simplistic ‘covering law’ image of how lawyers 
and judges function. The relationship of a more adequate image of legal argument to 
ascertaining the adequacy of legal reasoning, by parity with scientific inquiry, rests upon 
an adequate account of what makes legal reasoning as a system of inquiry more effective, 
an area in which much work needs to be done. Breadth and depth point to consistency in 
the basis for judgment a possible surrogate for the appeal to equality before the law, a 
presumptive criterion for adequacy. Degree of articulation appeals to relevant difference, 
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another goal of legal systems, in the face of the over-extension of principles to unlike 
cases.  
Ethical reasoning consists of broadly relevant principles, some of them meta-
ethical that have been exposed to human understanding through decades of practical, 
religious and philosophical inquiry. Meta-ethical principles encapsulated in such 
fundamental postures as consequentialism and deontology have been articulated by 
philosophers and have been applied to myriads of human decisions along with their 
correlative concern with human suffering and universalizability (lack of special 
pleading). Countless equally robust ethical principles have been codified in religious and 
legal systems since such systems have been available in written records, and undoubtedly 
before then in ancient and well-established practices. Killing, theft, injury, family life and 
the concerns of exchange have all been the subject of ethical scrutiny and the human race 
in aggregate and within particular cultures has available no shortage of general 
prohibitions and other sorts of mandates. The problem is their application, and especially 
the coherent application of such principles in light of the complexity of human action and 
our limited ability to foresee consequences and other sorts of ramifications. As we have 
seen earlier legal systems are constructed to deal with such complexity by having 
hierarchies of evaluation that reach down to cases, and slowly change as new cases 
confront old precedents. Legal reasoning is constructed to utilize this interplay and has 
codified. in terms of clear institutionalized procedures and priorities, methods for 
determining the array of principles to be applied in a case, looking towards a defeasible 
determination. 
In ethics we have access to cases and broad principles, this is itself explains the 
two poles of ethical discussion, casuistry on the one hand, philosophical ethics on the 
other. But given the abstraction of principles and the specificity of cases what are clearly 
needed are medium level generalizations that both reflect principles and that permit the 
salient details of cases to become apparent. The model gives us a clue as to how to 
advance. Naturally, the MET gives little help in inventing such mediating principles but it 
does point to criteria for adequacy. 
The first is that mediating principles should sort cases into bundles based on 
modest generalizations, consistent with higher order principles, and yet be illustrative of 
salient aspects of the cases. The issues is, of course, salience, we can not look at such 
medium level principles at a point, but rather have to see how they fair when confronted 
with the dimensions of ethical decision making. All things being equal they should form a 
chain of increasingly general principles, while being rooted in the cases. In the law such 
concepts are built into levels of seriousness in the violation of general legal prohibitions. 
For example, the sequence first, second, third degree murder, manslaughter and 
justifiable homicide as a function of the heinous nature of the crime and criminal intent 
differentiates, in a clear ordering, violations of the principle against taking a human life. 
Such an ordering permits relevantly similar cases to be grouped and appropriate middle 
level principles to apply. Substantive moral principles should do no less. 
Such sorting of moral cases requires that moral principles, like legal principles, 
should identify the aspects of a case that are salient for moral judgment. That is to say a 
logically powerful moral principle lets us see what in a case matters in light of our need 
to make a moral judgment that is universal across a class of relevantly similar cases. 
Long-standing disputes such as the abortion debate require, at least, that a substantive 
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moral principle determining what is human life and when it begins be available. Although 
there is no agreement as to what that is, the MET shows us why if it needed. That is the 
second contribution of the MET, a focus on breadth and depth. This enables is to 
illuminate the texture of the warranting argumentation. In the abortion debate, each 
position relies on different higher-order principles whether scientific, religious or 
sociological. Such principles exist within a network of moral concerns. Each network 
striving for internal coherence through inferential relations between the principles it 
includes, and attempts to illustrate its adequacy by the role of such principles in clear 
cases and its consistency with higher-order relevant principles (in the abortion debate the 
rights of a woman to personal physical integrity in one network, human life at the point of 
conception in another). In terms of the MET each principle appeals to the depth of the 
moral reach and the concomitant breadth of its application. The right to physical integrity 
is a powerful argument because is unifies so many ethical judgments ranging from 
prohibitions against assault to unequal access to medical clear, and similarly for the 
absolute definition of life at conception. The recalcitrance of the debate can now readily 
be seen once we realize that each of these networks of values form a unique and 
heretofore incommensurable backing for the argument. It is only by a grand unification of 
e.g. religious and humanistic value networks that a definitive resolution is to be hoped 
for. Failing that unification we can only look for the history of effectiveness of each of 
the moral constellations and opt in light of their progressive nature which one it is 
rational to adhere to given their comparative histories at a point. Whether a natural notion 
of effectiveness, parallel to the obvious effectiveness of physical science can be 
elaborated once an adequate model of progress can be applied to ethics rests, as on an 
account of the goals of moral reasoning. As with legal reasoning, consistency of the 
underlying principles and sensitivity to the particulars have some prima facie force as 
indicators of adequacy. What may seem astounding is that such intuitions are given 
precise mathematical content in the MET. What is clear is that the considerations 
presented here are obvious from the point of view of the MET, and perhaps not as 
obvious from other logical reconstructions of moral argument. 
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